Speaker: Kostas Zachariadis - London School of Economics
Series: Economics Seminar Series
Location: Room D221, Social Sciences Building, St John Street, City University London, EC1R 0JD
We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers, each of whom wishes to buy at most one item, and m sellers, each of whom has one item to sell. The traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms for trading are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and o_ers from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market-clearing price. It fails to achieve all possible gains from trade because of strategic bidding by buyers. The designed mechanism is a revelation mechanism in which honest reporting of values/costs is incentive compatible and all gains from trade are achieved in equilibrium.
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When and where
5.00pm - 6.30pmWednesday 23rd October 2013