I am an applied microeconomic theorist with primary research interests in industrial organization and international trade. Within industrial organization, I focus mainly on information disclosure and product design. Within international trade, my focus has been mainly on political economy aspects of trade policy determination. Previously, I was an Associate Professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow (2014-2019), and an Assistant Professor at CERGE-EI in Prague (2006-2014). I received my Ph.D. from the University of Virginia.
Personal website: https://sites.google.com/site/celiklev/
- Ph.D., University of Virginia, United States, 2007
- M.A., University of Virginia, United States, 2002
- B.A., Bogazici University, Turkey, 2000
- Reader, City, University London, 2019 – present
- Director of Postgraduate Studies, City, University of London, 2019 – present
- Associate Professor of Economics, National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2014 – 2019
- Assistant Professor of Economics, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education – Economics Institute (CERGE-EI), 2006 – 2014
Czech, English and Turkish.
- Anderson, S.P. and Celik, L. (2020). Opaque selling. Information Economics and Policy. doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100869.
- Celik, L. and Karabay, B. (2016). Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron–Ferejohn model. Theory and Decision, 81(1), pp. 33–52. doi:10.1007/s11238-015-9520-1.
- Celik, L. (2016). Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 44, pp. 113–122. doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.002.
- Celik, L., Karabay, B. and McLaren, J. (2015). When is it optimal to delegate: The theory of fast-track authority. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3), pp. 347–389. doi:10.1257/mic.20140031.
- Anderson, S.P. and Celik, L. (2015). Product line design. Journal of Economic Theory, 157, pp. 517–526. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.014.
- Celik, L. (2014). Information unraveling revisited: Disclosure of horizontal attributes. Journal of Industrial Economics, 62(1), pp. 113–136. doi:10.1111/joie.12043.
- Celik, L. (2014). A More General Framework to Analyze Whether Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient or Excessive. Review of Industrial Organization, 44(2), pp. 161–178. doi:10.1007/s11151-013-9409-5.
- Celik, L., Karabay, B. and McLaren, J. (2013). Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining. Journal of International Economics, 91(2), pp. 179–190. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.09.001.
- Celik, L., Akoz, K.K. and Arbatli, C.E. Manipulation through Biased Product Reviews. The Journal of Industrial Economics.
- Celik, L., Karabay, B. and McLaren, J. Fast-Track Authority: A Hold-Up Interpretation. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3139181.
- Anderson, S.P. and Celik, L. Opaque Selling. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3521450.