Admission Price: Free to attend
This seminar is part of the Department of Economics Seminar Series 2017-18. The seminars are open to all - no registration necessary. If you would like to receive email notification of the Department’s seminars, please send your request to Kim.Edmunds.firstname.lastname@example.org.
Speaker: Dr Julien Combe (University College London)
To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. We show that these mechanisms performs much better by adopting a large market approach and by using a rich dataset on teachers' applications in France. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more than doubles under our mechanism.
[Julien Combe (UCL), Olivier Tercieux (PSE), Camille Terrier (MIT)]
Share this event
When and where
3.00pm - 4.30pmWednesday 1st November 2017