Admission Price: This event is free to attend.
Speakers: Austin Long, Brendan R. Green
CIPS (Centre for International Policy Studies), Dept of International Politics, is pleased to host a talk by Austin Long (Columbia University) and Brendan R. Green (University of Cincinnati), co-authors of “Clandestine Capabilities and Deterrence in World Politics”.
Professor Theo Farrell, Dean of the School of Arts and Social Sciences, will chair the evening.
International political outcomes are deeply shaped by the balance of power, but some military capabilities rely on secrecy in order to be effective (e.g. certain forms of cyber, signals intelligence, space systems, electronic warfare, stealth or counter-stealth). These “clandestine capabilities” pose problems for deterrence. If clandestine capabilities are revealed, adversaries may be able to take steps that attenuate the advantages they are supposed to provide. On the other hand, if these capabilities are not revealed then deterrence failures may be inevitable- the Dr. Strangelove Doomsday Machine problem.
We outline a conceptual and propositional inventory about the status of clandestine capabilities in world politics, focusing our analysis on nuclear forces. After outlining the importance of clandestine capabilities for policy and theory, we provide a typology of clandestine capabilities, using it to argue that military power is increasingly dependent upon secrecy, with a discussion of the conditions under which clandestine nuclear capabilities might provide leverage and the mechanisms by which they can do so. The resulting propositional inventory is fleshed out with a diverse array of empirical examples but with a focus on strategic anti-submarine warfare in the Cold War.
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When & where
5.30pmMonday 13th March 2017